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COMMENTS ON THE GRISWOLD CASE

THE GRISWOLD PENUMBRA: CONSTITUTIONAL
CHARTER FOR AN EXPANDED LAW
OF.PRIVACY?
Robert G. Dixon, Jr.*
an "uncommonly silly law" 1 produces the "most significant decision" 2 of the Supreme Court term, and the sevenman majority has to be held together with four opinions, some inquiry is in order. Either there is some hyperbole in the terms "silly"
and "significant," or we are witnessing the birth of a new facet of constitutional meaning as an offshoot'of a rather special case concerning
Connecticut's attempted prohibition of birth control clinics through
the utilization of its statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives.
Griswold v. Connecticut 8 contains the clearest articulation to date
(although it is none too clear at that) of the constitutional foundations of a yearning for "privacy," which constitutes a major component of "the American dream." More subjective even than
"liberty" and "justice," the "privacy" idea ovei:laps both,: and even
turns back on itself to create internal contradictions. For example,
privacy is an activist concept supporting freedom of expression in
the associational privacy cases. But it is a passivist concept-the right
to be let alone-in the school prayer and Bible-reading area, where
it has been argued, without explicit judicial recognition as yet,4
that even an excusal system does not save the regulation, because the
necessary requirement of self-identification (in order to obtain permission to absent oneself) itself constitutes an invasion of privacy.
Nevertheless, there is a common feature of the two concepts-an
interest in nondisclosure of one's identity.
If what follows is as long on privacy in general as on Griswold, it
is because the case is longer on yearning than on substantive content.
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• Professor of Law, George Washington University.-Ed.
I. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
2. Keeffe, Practicing Lawyers' Guide to the Current Law Magazines, 51 A.B.A.J.
885 (1965).
3. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4. Sec School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 319 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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The editors' invitation to discuss the case has prompted a rethinking
of a temporarily postponed project on a synthesis on privacy-a task
easier to outline than to execute.
All that Griswold actually decided was that a statutory system
which operated to make it a crime for married couples to use contraceptives (although there was not even a hint of direct enforcement), and for clinics to conduct examinations and prescribe
contraceptives (which was the actual enforcement issue), was unconstitutional. The substantive statute merely prohibited contraceptive
use; a general aiding and abetting statute furnished the grounds for
suppression of the clinic. In order to reach (or create) a privacy issue,
the Court allowed the sole defendants-Mrs. Griswold, the clinic
director, and Dr. Buxton, the clinic medical director-to assert the
rights of married clients of the clinic. The case was discussed judicially, therefore, as though the key issue was state scrutiny of the
marital couch; questions concerning the validity of regulations on
the manufacture, distribution, and sale of contraceptives, and concerning the validity of the regulation of birth control clinics absent
an anti-contraceptive use statute were left unresolved.
To reach the conclusion that the Connecticut laws were unconstitutional, Mr. Justice Douglas, writing the opinion of the Court,
first took a broad view of "standing" to assert the rights of third
parties, and then, on the merits, ranged broadly through the Bill
of Rights, talking loosely about "zones of privacy" 5 directly or
peripherally protected by the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth
amendments. In even broader fashion, Mr. Justice Goldberg took
great pains to revive the "forgotten" ninth amendment, 6 so that it
emerges especially suited to support whatever "other rights" can be
articulated.
The comments that follow are divided into a brief review, for
purposes of perspective, of the elusive nature of "privacy" as developed in American law to date, and an attempted rigorous analysis
of the privacy aspects of Griswold. A final section suggests that
effectuation of the new constitutional right of marital privacy necessarily or derivatively implies a corollary right of access to birth
control information and devices-a right which should have been
more clearly articulated by the Court.
5. 381 U.S. at 484.
6. Id. at 490 n.6, referring to

PATIERSON, THE FoRGOITEN

NINTH

AMENDMENT

(1955).
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l. PROLEGOMENON ON PRIVACY

One of the warmest words in the literature of political and legal
philosophy is "privacy." Characterized as the "right to be let alone" 7
in Mr. Justice Brandeis' oft-quoted statement, it has been accorded
first rank as the most valued right of civilized men. Few concepts,
however, are more vague or less amenable to definition and structured treatment than privacy. Under this emotional term march a
whole congeries of interests, some closely interrelated, some almost
wholly unrelated and everi inconsistent. Two broad, variant strands
are the "public law" meaning of privacy and the "private law" meaning of privacy, but even within these two broad categories quite
different species of claims and conflict arise, and loose terminology
abounds.
A. "Privacy" in Private Law
In the robust tradition of the common law, as was so well summarized in the seminal essay by Warren and Brandeis on the privatelaw meaning of privacy, 8 little redress was available for the more
refined forms of intrusion by one private person on the solitude and
psychic integrity of another. Unless the invasion amounted to a trespass or a nuisance, or could be characterized as a breach of confidence
or of implied contract, or affected something like a letter in which
· the aggrieved party could assert a property interest of sorts, relief
was not forthcoming. The major contribution of Warren and
Brandeis was in showing through rigorous critical analysis that
doctrines of trespass, nuisance, and property were inadequate for
the occasion, and that a new co:q.cept of protectible privacy could
and should be evolved, both as a basis for an intelligible rationale
for the handful of existing cases and for future development.
In the process of evolution, what seemed like a single concept has
been refined into a loose conglomeration of four torts which, as Dean
Prosser has noted, 9 have little in common other than interference
with a person's "right to be let alone." The four torts are (I) intrusion on physical solitude or seclusion; (2) publication of unpleasant,
although non-defamatory, information about a person; (3) placing
of a person in a false but not necessarily defamatory position in the
public eye (for example, by attributing to him views that he does
7. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
8. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAR.v. L. REv. 193 (1890).
9. PRossER, ToRTS 832 (3d ed. 1964) •.
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not hold); (4) unauthorized commercial use of a person's name or
picture. From a functional standpoint it appears that two quite
different interests are being protected: freedom from physical intrusion on solitude, and freedom from unwanted communication
aborit oneself. Use of the term "right of privacy" as an index heading
is confined almost exclusively to these private torts, in addition to
some governmental search and seizure matters, wiretapping-eavesdropping, and self-incrimination.
Dean Prosser has appropriately observed that the courts have
been so preoccupied with the question whether the tort exists at
all that there has been little discussion of its juristic nature and
limitations. However, his own suggestion of substituting a generic
tort-intentional infliction of mental suffering-hardly seems adequate, because in few of the privacy cases is there "pure" malice.
The presence of other interests, which explains such limiting doctrines as the press privilege of dissemination of "newsworthy"
information, indicates that a balancing process must be going on,
although it is not always clearly articulated what is being balanced,
particularly on behalf of the injured party. An "intentional infliction" doctrine could render the right of privacy in tort law overly
narrow, in the process of making it more absolute. For thi~ reason
there is much appeal in a recent attempt to keep attention focused
on privacy as an aspect of human dignity, or, indeed, as a "spiritual
interest"10 rather than merely as an interest in property and reputation. Although such an approach may not make cases any easier to
solve, it may help to keep attention focused on those elements of
privacy which make it uniquely valued among laymen, who, after
all, are the customers of the law.
B. "Privacy" in Public Law
In regard to the relations between a government and its citizens,
the use of the term "right of privacy" suggests issues and values quite
different from those encountered in private law. The term nowhere
appears in the Constitution, but is quite obviously a background
interest underlying the specific guarantees of the third, fourth, and
fifth amendments in regard to quartering of troops, search and
seizure, and self-incrimination. Important as the last two categories
IO. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 962 (1964),
Professor Bloustein's article was prepared under the auspices of the Special Committee
on Science and Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, as part
of its study examining the impact of modern technology upon privacy.
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are, they represent well-established categories already subjected to
extensive discussion. Furthermore, although they overlap to a degree
the private tort of intrusion upon solitude, neither has been deemed
germane to at least two of the several major, recurring "privacy"
problems of our time-wiretapping and eavesdropping,11 and freewheeling legislative investigations of persons unable or unwilling to
plead self-incrimination.12
If the fourth and fifth amendments are deemed to exhaust the
field of constitutional protection of privacy, then it is a rather
narrow field and one unbefitting the concept of privacy as the preeminent right of civilized men. However, there are a number of
additional outreaches of privacy in American public law, albeit of
uncertain dimension, as manifestations of the continuing development of the first amendment and of the concept of due process.
Examples include the various privacies associated with the field of
religion and belief,13 privacy in politics, including the secret ballot14
and nondisclosure of political or social beliefs and associations,1 5 the
scope of employee duties of candor and disclosure,16 the use of nonCommunist oaths and oaths in general,17 statutory protection of the
solitude of householders by restrictions on canvassing,18 freedom of
associational choice, including self-segregation, in "private" housing,
education, and other fields.19
Of course, apart from the question of specific constitutional protection of privacy, the American concept. of limited government
11. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952): Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928); cf. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
12. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); Braden v. United States, 365
U.S. 431 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); cf. Deutch v. United
States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961).
,
13. It is questionable whether privacy is furthered by West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), which granted a broad exemption from a flag
salute requirement in the interest of a general freedom of speech and belief, but allowed the flag salute requirement to continue. See Dixon, Religion, Schools, and the
open Society: A Socio-Constitutional Issue, 13 J. Pun. L. 267, 281-88 (1965).
14. Nutting, Freedom of Silence-Constitutional Protection Against Governmental
Intrusions in Political Affairs, 47 M1cH. L. REv. 181 (1948). .
15. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
16. Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S.
468 (1958); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
17. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368
U.S. 278 (1961);· Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183 (1952).
18. Breard, v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
19. Avins, The Right Not To Listen, 51 A.B.A.J. 656 (1965); Avins, Freedom of
Choice in Personal Service Occupations-Thirteenth Amendment Limitations on Antidiscrimination Legislation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 228 (1964); Avins, Prima Facie Tort and
Injunction-New Remedies Against Sitdowns, 24 GA. B.J. 20 (1961).
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formerly helped to maximize privacy by affording a protection of
sorts to economic, social, and racial laissez-faire. This domain of
privacy inherent in a system of limited government has now been
considerably eroded by the freeing of federal legislative power
through broad construction of the commerce and expenditure
clauses, and by the demise of substantive due process as a check on
economic and social legislation.20 Both the purpose and the effect of
the new legislative norms and extensive administrative regulation
are to diminish the area of "free" contract, a supposed freedom
resting at times on imbalances in knowledge and bargaining power
between investor and dealer, worker and employer, and supplier
and manufacturer. But the impact of much of the regulation may
not be so much to diminish the right to be let alone as to diminish
a power to act as one pleases without regard to external impacts,
which is not quite the same thing.
C. The Idea of Privacy
A lengthy essay could be written on the historical evolution of
privacy concepts21 from the early Greek "politics of participation,"
in which personal virtue was equated with civic virtue and privacy
had no place, to the robust individualism of the American frontier,
where the mores of society forbade inquiry into a man's past. Suffice
it to say that the exploration would entail inquiry into the JudeaChristian concept of the "soul," that recessive, untouchable essence
of man, the Germanic concept of the "folk," in which the individual
found pis true identity and expression, and the Reformation theory
of direct and personal relation to God. In a study of the modem
era, particular stress would have to be placed on the natural-rights
movement, which postulates the intrinsic value of pre-social personal
status and absolute birthrights; on the abstrusities of Rousseau,
where the absorption of the individual will into the socialized
"general will" implies total abnegation of privacy; and on the recent
pragmatic evolution of democratic socialism and the security state,
in which the forces of organization threaten to crowd out privacy
and, indeed, all of the passive virtues.22
20. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court, 1962 SuP. CT. REv.
84.

21. See generally SABINE, A HISTORY OF PoLmCAL THEORY (rev. ed. 1950).
22. The growing corporate and government practice of psychiatric evaluation and
psychological testing of employees poses interesting questions about the range and
depth of probing, about the limits of required disclosure to employers, and about
means of safeguarding against arbitrariness in the use of such data by employers.
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The extent to which one finds privacy interests and threatened
invasions of privacy interests depends largely on how the term is
defined, or, if definition is impossible, how the term is conceived.
Many commentators23 have begun with the broad and warm Brandeisian invocation of a "right to be let alone." But only a hermit
living outside society has such a right; unqualified, the "right" flies
in the face of all social control. For what purpose is a person let
alone? Are social purposes served by the right so that, in according
recognition to the right, society is actually serving its long-term
interest while restraining its immediate impulse to assert control?
Does society, by recognizing the right, preserve and encourage personal well-springs of creativity and differentiation-needed by
society if it is to avoid stagnation-which would be stifled by compelled conformity to majoritarian values and practices? Or is a "social" justification of privacy a self-defeating thing, undercutting the
essence of the privacy interest? Is being let alone an end in itself
as part of the dignity of man, akin to a natural right, needing no
utilitarian justification in terms of social product? In short, is
privacy intrinsic or derivative?
Obviously, radically different approaches originate in these different premises. Even though it be granted that a balancing of competing claims, values, and "goods" is always present as part of the
never-ending process of reasoned choice, it still may make a world
of difference whether one postulates social control and demands that
privacy prove its social utility, or postulates privacy and counsels
official restraint even where the privacy "good" is uncertain and the
official action is aimed toward a "good" end. The latter approach is
not quite the same thing as the "preferred position" approach in
regard to freedom of expression, because in evaluating freedoms of
expression we are weighing an identifiable, outward-looking course
of conduct against competing social standards and interests. Speech,
publication, and parades involve overt measurable conduct rather
than privacy. It is only when we tum to a freedom of non-expression
or inaction that privacy as a distinctive concept enters the calculus.
Freedoms of expression can exist without enjoying a "preferred"
position, although their exact content may be affected. But to deny
to privacy the character of a self-justifying end is, perforce, to socialize it; and to socialize it is to foredoom it to unequal competition
with easily perceived, immediate, and pressing needs of society.24
23. E.g., Griswold, The Right To Be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 216 (1960).
24. "Once privacy is invaded, privacy is gone." Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343
U.S. 451, 469 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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The free-speech claimant asserts deviant views and values; the privacy
claimant doesn't want to play ball at all. The former is still part
of the open society and fights his battle in the marketplace of ideas;
the latter is part of the closed society and fights to withhold his
allegiance and perhaps even his identity and associations.
The premise of intrinsic privacy as an end in itself is clearly
perceived in the fourth amendment, where we start with the nearly
absolute premise that a man's home is his castle, and the fifth amendment, where we accord silence', and secrecy to the known or putative
criminal.25 Outside these areas, life situations may blur the distinctions between intrinsic privacy and socially derivative privacy, and
the quite continuous blurring in judicial usage has made a reasoned
evolution of a distinctive privacy concept quite difficult, if not impossible. For example, is associational privacy, which the NAACP
has recently achieved but the Communist Party has not, 20 an independent right, protecting a basic secrecy-solitude interest? Or is it
a derivative benefit, supporting freedom of political action and
having no independent significance? If it is the latter, should not
some term other than "associational privacy" be used, such as "freedom of secret association for public action"?
A further problem in the prevalent loose characterizations of
privacy as the "right to be let alone" is that the right tends to become
indistinguishable from a policy of laissez-/aire, promoting general
freedom of action. One possibility for separating "privacy" from
"freedom" as juristic concepts would be to focus on the idea of limits
upon society's power either to make exposure or force disclosure of
matters which the individual would prefer to keep secret. Thus
narrowed, the term would be removed from the area of general
laissez-faire interest, but the privacy concept might then be too
narrow, because it would be revealed as centering really on an interest in "secrecy," which is not a "warm" idea at all. Even though we
have achieved the secret ballot in order to ensure an exact translation of private views into public choice, the "stand up and be
counted" slogan still has wide appeal as indicative of a robust and
25. Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960
SUP, Cr. R.Ev. 46.
26. Compare Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 872 U.S. 589
(1963), with Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). While this article was in
· galley the Supreme Court, on grounds of self-incrimination, set aside orders under
the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 compelling registration of Communist
Party members, Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 86 Sup, Ct. 194 (1965),
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fearless honesty. Secrecy commonly conveys a connotation of forbidden conspiracies, and conspiracies find few defenders.27 .
Secrecy nevertheless may be an important component of the core
idea of privacy as a public-law concept, and to this probably should
be added the £actor of "solitude"-freedom from certain social
impositions and pressures. The meaning of privacy, as thus refined
and separated from a generalized concept of freedom~ may be fairly
well encompassed by the twin ideas of secrecy, which protects th~
nondisclosure interest, and solitude, which protects against coercions
of belief or, derivatively, against actions designed to make the holding of belief uncomfortable, or against any undue social intrusions
on the intimacies and dignities of life. As already noted, however,
these twin ideas are Janus-faced, because secrecy in the context of
associational privacy is an activist concept supporting political action, whereas solitude in the context of nondisclosure of nonconformity is a passivist, right-to-be-let-alone concept. ·
When marital privacy is recognized, and then used to defend
birth control clinics, an added dimension, which is neither secrecy
nor solitude, seems to appear-a right of access to information relevant to the specific condition of privacy at issue. To this we now turn.

II. Griswold AND

THE RIGHT TO

PRIV4CY

What does Griswold add to the judicial literature on the dimensions of privacy in its constitutional .or public-law aspects? It does
little, certainly, to clarify the conceptual dimensions of the privacy
concept. But it does much to provide varied and flexible constitu~
tional ·underpinnings for those situations which do not fit established
categories neatly but still seem to rest on values thought to be vital
and which, for lack of a better term, are called privacy. In Griswold
the Court avoided defining privacy narrowly and particularly, arid
also avoided tying it to one or two supporting (but also necessarily
limiting) clauses in the Constitution. By the very breadth and uncertainty of the opinions, especially the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas
for the Court-an opinion which roams through the Bill of Rights
picking up a letter here and another there to spell out the ·:riew
27. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 577 (1951) Qackson, J., concurring): "The law of conspiracy has been the chief means at the Government's disposal
to deal with the growing problems created by such organizations. I happen to think
it is an awkward and inept remedy, but I find no constitutional authority for taking
this weapon from the Government. There is no constitutional right to 'gang up' on
the Government."
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right-the door was left open for continued probing and refinement
of the privacy principle.

A. The Penumbral Approach
There is already a rich terrain to be investigated and a great need
for closer analysis, as indicated by the varied content of the "zones
of privacy," 28 and by the range of controversy over "penumbra!
rights of 'privacy and repose,' " 29 suggested by the cases cited by Mr.
Justice Douglas, who mentioned more than a half dozen "privacy"
situations. For example, the new derivative first amendment right
of associational privacy was articulated in N AA GP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson30 as the "freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations." The right of religious belief was supported by West Virginia
State Board of Educ. v. Barnette.31 The right to be undisturbed by
the doorbell ringing of commercial solicitors was supported in
Breard v. Alexandria.32 The right to be undisturbed by music and
spoken advertisements while riding in public conveyances was denied
by a sharply divided Court in Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak.88
The right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure received
added protection through the extension to the state courts of the
exclusionary rule regarding illegally seized evidence in Mapp v.
Ohio,34 and was further strengthened in Monroe v. Pape, 8 r, which
dealt with the liability under the federal constitution of municipal
police officers for illegal invasion and search of a home. The privacy
of the jail cell was viewed dimly, but apparently not completely
eradicated, in the recent dispute in Lanza v. New York 86 over the
use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping. The sanctity of the
household, at least a household graced by a half-ton pile of trash and
rodent feces, had to give way to permit rat-control inspection without a warrant-but only by a 5-4 vote.87 Mr. Justice Douglas also
alluded in Griswold to Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 88
which invalidated Oklahoma's provision for compulsory sterilization
of certain categories of habitual criminals, although his own opinion
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

381 U.S. at 484.
Id. at 485.
357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
341 U.S. 622 (1951).
343 U.S. 451 (1952).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
370 U.S. 139 (1962).
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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for the Court in Skinner had stood not on the ground of intrinsic
privacies in procreation, but rather on the denial of equal protection
involved in the classification scheme used in the statute.
The foregoing cases were simply listed by Mr. Justice Douglas
and were not subjected to a fresh conceptual discussion; there was
no attempt either to interrelate them or to use their particularity as
a way of getting at a possible general central value of privacy. The
list certainly reveals, however, a ri.ch potpourri of privacy matters,
and more certainly could be added; Mr. Justice Douglas was only
using illustrative examples with no intention of being exhaustive.

B. The "Forgotten" Ninth Amendment
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg, joined by the
Chief Justice and Mr.Justice Brennan, rests on the ninth amendment, and, indeed, constitutes the first major judicial treatment of
the ninth amendment, which states: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny o'r disparage others retained by the people."
Mr. Justice Goldberg's focus on the ninth amendment does not
narrow the breadth and multiplicity of the zones of privacy suggested by Mr. Justice Douglas. His special stress on the almost unfathomable ninth amendment strongly reaffirms the preexisting
constitutional tradition of using substantive due process as a broad
vehicle for judicial articulation and protection of "fundamental liberties," whether or not they are specified elsewhere in the Constitution. And the ultimate effect may be to heighten the prospects for
judicial support, case by case, for a broader range of "privacy" situations and of other hard-to-classify interests which, despite their
vagueness, should be "retained by the people" in a democratic public
order strongly committed to preserving individuality.
There may very well be some past denials of privacy claims, such
as those involved with the music and advertising programs in public
conveyances that were at issue in Pollak, which might strike the
Court differently if passed in review again under the ninth amendment. Tactically, of course, use of the ninth amendment could be a
basis for reaching a contrary result ·without the necessity of reversing the earlier decisions. Mr. Justice Goldberg's approach, in short,
does not offer assistance in defining privacy, but is at least congenial
to further probing and experimentation.
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C. Substantive Due Process and Privacy

The separate concurrences of Mr. Justice Harlan and of Mr.
Justice White, although related more to general principles of constitutional interpretation and statutory analysis than to privacy per
se, are not uncongenial to continued attempts to develop privacy as
a more general constitutional principle than heretofore. Earlier, in
the unsuccessful Poe v. Ullman 89 challenge to the same Connecticut
statute, Mr. Justice Harlan had made an exceptionally apt statement,
which Mr. Justice Goldberg quoted approvingly in Griswold:
· Certainly the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely
from the sanctity of property rights. The home derives its preeminence as the seat of family life. And the integrity of that life
is something so fundamental that it has been found to draw to
its protection the principles of more than one explicitly granted
Constitutional right. . . . Of this whole "private realm of family life" it is difficult to imagine what is more private or more
intimate than a husband and wife's marital relations. 40
The main thrust of Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Griswold was to oppose Mr. Justice Black's view that the fourteenth
amendment is grounded in the Bill of Rights and impliedly limited
thereby. 41 Mr. Justice Harlan would preserve the fourteenth amendment as a perpetually fresh basis for safeguarding basic values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."42
Mr. Justice White's opinion begins with an acceptance of the
Harlan view of the fourteenth amendment and perhaps even enlarges on it. He suggested that a statute with effects like that of the
Connecticut statute "bears a substantial burden of justification when
attacked under the Fourteenth Amendment," 48 and then proceeded
to an analysis demonstrating that the Connecticut statute was not
reasonably related, in its terms and operation, to the legitimate
objective of barring extramarital affairs. ·
D. Negative View: Privacy and "Clear Meaning"
Both Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Stewart emerged as dissenters in Griswold, but not necessarily as "anti-privatarians." Mr.
39. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
40. 381 U.S. at 495 (concurring opinion) (quoting _from Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 551-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
· 41. Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights1The Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140 (1949).
42. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
43. 381 U.S. at 503 (concurring opinion).
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Justice Black was the only Justice to stress sufficiently the· fact that
" 'privacy' is a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept." 44 Privacy
is broader than any one amendment because several of the specific
guarantees are designed in part to protect something that might be
called privacy, but each guarantee is also broader than privacy.
For example, Mr. Justice Black correctly criticized the tendency
to talk about the fourth amendment "as though it protects nothing
but 'privacy.' " 45 As he pointed out, a person may be _more annoyed
by an unceremonious public arrest and consequent search by a policeman than by a seizure in the privacy of his home. Similarly, there
may be something instructive in the common over-use of the "privacy" label by persons writing about the fourth and fifth amendments. 46 Although conceptual clarity is not advanced by the practice,
the ·writer obtains a title which attracts more interest than would a
"search and seizure" label, and which evokes an instinctively sympathetic emotional response. This observation applies equally to
the over-use of the privacy label by writers in the field of libel and
slander, or on tort-law protections of other aspects of personality.47
The main thrust of Mr. Justice Black's dissent, however, lies
elsewhere. While he likes his privacy "as well as the next one,"48 he
recognizes a right of the government to invade it, not when there is
a counterbalancing governmental interest (heresy!), but whenever
government is not "prohibited by some specific constitutional provision."49 The remainder of the disseQ.t develops further his theories
of constitutional interpretation. It may come as a surprise to some
to find that all Mr. Justice Black has been doing in !iis constitutional
adjudication, at least in his own self-analysis, ~s to apply the "clear
meaning" of the constitutional text. 50 Be that as it may, his "clear
44. Id. at 509 (dissenting opinion).
45. Ibid.
46. See, e.g., Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court,
1962 SUP. CT. REv. 212. Compare King, Electronic Surveillance and Constitutional
Rights, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 240 (1964), an essay with a modest title but with a
sensitive perception of larger privacy issues and the need for a penumbra! approach
in constitutional interpretation in this field.
47. ERNST&: SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY-The RIGHT To BE LET ALONE (1962); HOFSTADTER
&: HOROWITZ, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY (1964); Blaustein, supra note 10.
48. 381 U.S. at 510 (dissenting opinion).
49. Ibid. .
50. See MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER-CONFLICT IN THE°COURT 5160 (1961); Frantz, The First Amendment .in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962);
Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First 'Amendment-Absolutes in the Balance, 50
CALIF. L. REv. 821 (1962); Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor
Mendelson, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 729 (1963); Mendelson, The First Amendment and the
Judicial Process-A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REv. 479 (1964). See also.Black
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meaning" yielded no protection for privacy in this instance. It may
not be too clear to some students of constitutional law why, under
Mr. Justice Black's "clear meaning" analysis, obscenity,li1 group
libel,52 and associational privacy53 are constitutional absolutes along
with simple free speech, while marital privacy, in the Griswold context of access to birth control information, is no part of the dueprocess liberty which the fourteenth amendment applies to the states.
And is it just the "clear meaning" of the fourteenth amendment
which requires a nationally uniform practice in regard to exclusion
of illegally seized evidence, 54 standards of self-incrimination and
immunity statutes, 55 and the right to counsel? 56 To pursue these
questions, which are essentially questions of methods of constitutional interpretation, would take us away from the subject of privacy
and should be handled in a separate paper.
Although Mr. Justice Black's "clear meaning" did not in this
instance yield a privacy shield for Mrs. Griswold or contraceptives
for her clients, there is always the possil:,ility that the "clear meaning" of the Constitution may yield privacy protection in other fact
situations. One aspect of "clear meaning" jurisprudence is its unpredictability, in the guise of being best articulated. 57 It can be
& Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes"-A Public Interview, 37
N.Y.U.L. REv. 549 (1962).
51. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
52. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 275 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
53. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 559 (1963}

(Black, J., concurring).
54. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (Black, J., concurring).
55. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), Mr. Justice Black voted with the majority.
56. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
57. That "clear meaning" may not leave clear tracks and ensure predictability is
indicated by the surprise some liberals felt in regard to Mr. Justice Black's recent
support of state power in the 1964 sit-in decisions (see especially his dissenting opinions in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 318 (1964), and Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378
U.S. 347, 363 (1964)), his dissent in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 575 (1965), from
the Court's reversal of convictions for picketing near the courthouse, and his dissent
in Griswold itself. In Cox he said: "Those who encourage minority groups to believe
that the United States Constitution and federal laws give them a right to patrol and
picket in the streets whenever they choose, in order to advance what they think to
be a just and noble end, do no service to those minority groups, their cause, or their
country." 379 U.S. at 584. If picketing is a form of free speech, Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88 (1940), this language, whether sound or unsound, is something less than
first amendment absolutism.
See also Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960), where, with civil rights and civil
liberties interests in conflict, Justices Douglas and Black in dissent would have barred
the Civil Rights Commission from using confidential informants and from forbidding
cross-examination in its hearings on alleged violations by the state of Louisiana of
Negro rights. Was it only the "clear meaning" theory that kept Justices Douglas and
Black in dissent, while the other half of the liberal block, the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Brennan, split off and supported the Commission?
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viewed as really a code jurisprudence rather than a common-law
jurisprudence, although this may involve re-assessing Mr. Justice
Black as a frustrated Napoleonic jurist. Perhaps its prime virtue is
that it can lead to a quick "up-dating" of constitutional meaning
without the need to worry much about the baggage of precedent.
And its lack of "balancing" makes a "Brandeis brief" approach irrelevant. It lies, in short, at the opposite pole from that muchmaligned and usually totally misunderstood term, "neutral principles."58

E. Negative View: Is the Issue Privacy, or Access to Information?
Although Justices Black and Stewart joined in each others' dissents, the opinion ·written by Mr. Justice Stewart was quite unlike
that written by Mr. Justice Black. It was Stewart who coined the
phrase "uncommonly silly law," 59 a characterization of the statute
which caught the fancy of the press and appeared in numerous editorials. By "silly," he seems to have meant that the law was ·"obviously unenforceable, except in the oblique context of the present
case." 60
Although he did not pursue the point, this thought may have
been an oblique attack by Mr. Justice Stewart on the issue of standing. Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court was the only opinion
to discuss the problem of standing, which had defeated earlier attacks on the statute in the Tileston 61 and Poe cases. In Griswold, of
course, there had been an actual arrest of birth control clinic operators, whereas Tileston and Poe were only declaratory-judgment actions by physicians and patients in a setting of recent nonenforcement of the statute. Despite these distinctions, the Court's very brief
treatment of standing in Griswold is mystifying unless one realizes
that the matter had been carefully canvassed in Poe just four years
earlier, that the vote then was 5-4, and that Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
who had ·written the opinion for the Court in Poe, was no longer
on the bench.
" Nevertheless, there is still the question (and this also may have
troubled Mr. Justice Stewart) of how the Griswold case became a
58. See Stone, "Result-Orientation" and Appellate Judgment, in PERSPECTIVES OF
SCOTI 347 (1964), and the list of "neutral principles" articles' therein; Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).
59. 381 U.S. at 527 (dissenting opinion).
60. Ibid.
61. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
LAW: EssAYS FOR AUSTIN WAKEMAN
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right-of-marital-privacy case instead of a birth control clinic-regulatory policy case. It is instructive to remember Mr. Justice Bren•
nan's statement in Poe that the true controversy was over the opening of birth control clinics on a large scale. Because he felt that the
issue was not presented properly, he concurred in the dismissal of the
Poe case. Starting with this premise, it would seem that when the
birth control clinic issue was raised squarely in Griswold by the actual arrest of clinic operators, the Court's discussion should have fo.
cused to some extent on the question of the means and ends of state
power to regulate birth control clinics. Instead, the dispensers of
birth control advice were granted shelter under the marital privacy
of users of contraceptives.
To appreciate this aspect of the case it is important to recognize
that "standing" in this sequence of birth control cases is at least a
two-faceted issue. One facet is the actual threat of harm-the ques•
tion of the prospect of enforcement on which Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Poe turned. An actual arrest solved this difficulty
i~ Griswold. The other facet is the jus tertii issue-the standing of
the defendant clinic operators to defend themselves by raising the
rights of their clients to obtain birth control advice and to act on that
advice by using the prescribed contraceptives. In according the defendants standing to raise the constitutional rights of their married
clients, Mr. Justice Douglas said simply: "The rights of husband
. and wife, pressed here, are lik~ly to be diJuted or adversely affected
unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have
this kind of confidential relation to them." 62
Clearly, the "rights of husband and wife" which Mr. Justice
Douglas had in mind did not consist merely of an interest in having
the statute nullified so that the couple could use contraceptives without fear of police invasion of their bedroom. The interest would
have to be the broader one of an affirmative right of access to birth
control information so that they could regulate, more safely and
satisfactorily, the intimacies of their marital relationship.
It was this broad apprc;>ach toward standing, allowing the defendant clinic to raise the rights of married couples not before the Court,
which brought the marital-privacy issue to the fore. This approach
also submerged both the more· general question of state power to
regulate birth control clinics, and Mr. Justice White's concern
whether the means chosen were reasonably related to an assumed
62. 381 U.S. at 481.
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purpose of discouraging sexual promiscuity. The privacy issue thus
raised is seen on close analysis not to be simply a right to be let
alone; rather, it takes on the aspect of an affirmative right of access
to information concerning a very private sphere of life.
It may well be that Mr. Justice Stewart had an additional difficulty with the majority's approach. His robust realism68 led him to
reject the broad language in the majority opinions about preserving
the inviolability of the marital chamber, because there was never
any real prospect of statutory enforcement in that dfrection. Granting the clinic defendants standing to raise the issue of a right of
marital privacy in the use of contraceptives, and handling the case
primarily on this basis, does not help their cause from the Stewart
perspective; it hurts their cause because it directs attention to
an unreal situation and blunts the real issue, which is access to
information-and freedom to dispense information-about marital
privacies.
Since information relevant to marital privacies is what Griswold,
functionally viewed, comes down to, it is a pity that the majority
and the dissents did not join issue on what might be characterized
as a dissemination-of-information and making-privacy-effective type
of issue, supported by the first amendment. Both Justices Black and
Stewart noted this approach, but brushed it aside, albeit not very
convincingly. The approach involves an· analysis of the standing
and substantive rights of dispensers of birth control information, as
well as the standing and substantive rights of recipients of birth control information.
III. EFFECTUATING MARITAL PRIVACY: THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO
BIRTH CONTROL INFORMATION

Merely to phrase the above caption may be to suggest the kind
of conceptual confusion which seems to be inherent in the privacy
63. See, e.g., his opinions in the reapportionment decisions, Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 588 (1964), and companion cases in 377 U.S. at 676, 693, 712, and especially
744. Although in the opinion of the present writer (Reapportionment in the Supreme
Court and Congress-Constitutional Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 MICH. L. REV.
209 (1964)), no Justice covered himself with glory in the opinions written in the reapportionment decisions, as distinguished from the results, Mr. Justice Stewart came
closer than any other to hitting the mark and realizing that the battle concerned representation and not mathematical abstractions about equal masses of census statistics.
Also indicative of his realistic approach was his desire for more facts on the actual
impact on the child of prayer and Bible-reading practices- in public schools before
reaching and resolving the constitutional issues. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 319-20 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
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field. If privacy is essentially a state of peace and repose which we
seek to protect from invasion, does it not take some mental gymnastics to say that derived from this premise of privacy, or associated
with it as part of the core concept, there is a right of access to information relevant to rational use and enjoyment of the state of
privacy? But are not both elements unavoidably present in the
Griswold case, and does not the approach of the Court gloss over the
conceptual difficulties? Without the birth control clinic operation,
there would have been no case. The only interest of a married couple
vis-a-vis the clinic is an interest in obtaining information relevant
to a very private part of their lives. By invoking the married couples'
fictional fear of prosecution for use of contraceptives to give the
clinic defendants standing to defend themselves from actual prosecution for giving advice, the Court tied marital privacy and access to
information together into a single bundle of rights. The Court's
approach to standing also in effect reconstituted the facts and issues
at the appellate level. Had the reconstituted facts been the actual
facts, the decision probably would have been unanimous. To talk of
allowing "the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives" 64 is obviously
"repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."65
But what about the actual case of clinic operation, and the actual
question of the allowable range of that operation? What about the
BlaGk-Stewart distinction between mere advice and the actual dissemination of contrac-eptives as part of a "planned course of conduct"? If only advice had been involved, Justices Black and Stewart
apparently would have joined the majority on free-speech grounds,
but with no conscious overlay of marital privacy.
In effect, therefore, the Court used standing as a ploy to avoid
discussing these questions, which shape the real issue in the case, and
which the caption at the beginning of this section seeks to articulate.
The result reached by the Court is clear. The clinic can continue to
operate, and married couples, at least, have access to birth control
information by resort to the clinic. If this decision rests on the
peculiar wording of the Connecticut statute, which proscribed "use,"
then the decision is very narrow. Repeal of the "use" statute and
substitution of a statute regulating or proscribing clinic operation
64. 381 U.S. at 485.
65. Id. at 486.
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per se would present a fresh situation.66 But if the Court's stress on
"marital privacy" in the use of contraceptives extends to a right of
access to birth control information, then the case yields a broad
precedent indeed. In rationalizing it, scholars might dispute whether
the precedent can be derived from the first amendment alone, or
whether the "penumbra!" right of privacy is a necessary adjunct.
A perusal of the briefs67 :filed in the Supreme Court in
Griswold indicates that the attorneys conceived the essence of the
appeal to be either a due-process test of whether the Connecticut law
was a reasonable means to achieve ·a proper legislative purpose, or
a first amendment test of whether the statute violated any freespeech rights of the acting director of the clinic, Mrs. Griswold, and
the medical director, Dr. Buxton. Privacy was handled only in the
fictional context of bedroom invasion, with citations to Rochin v.
California. 68 There was no clear attempt either to extend the assertion of freedom of speech to include the right of clinic patients to
obtain birth control information, or to extend the assertion of the
right of marital privacy to include a right of access to information
intimately related to, and supportive of, conjugal privacy.
Free speech, discussed alone and unrelated to privacy, was
phrased variously in the briefs as a right to intellectual freedom, 69
freedom of expression,70 a right to disseminate information,71 a right
to practice medicine in accord with accepted scientific principles72
(better phrased perhaps as a right to speak the truth), a right of
physicians to advise patients,73 and a physician's freedom of professional conscience.74 For Justices Black and Stewart, all of this con66. It is doubtful, however, that the outcome would be different. The following
comment of Mr. Justice White, the only Justice to discuss the actual question of clinic
operation, is directly in point: "[I']he clear effect of these statutes, as enforced, is to
deny disadvantaged citizens of Connecticut, those without either adequate knowledge
or resources to obtain private counseling, access to medical assistance and up-to-date
information in respect to proper methods of birth control •.•. In my view, a statute
with these effects bears a substantial burden of justification when attacked under the
Fourteenth Amendment." 381 U.S. at 503 (concurring opinion).
67. Jurisdictional Statement for Appellants; Motion To Dismiss Appeal for Appellee; Brief for Appellants; Brief for Appellee; Brief for Catholic Council on Civil
Liberties as Amicus Curiae; Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and the
Connecticut Civil Liberties Union as · Amici Curiae; Brief for. Physicians as Amici
Curiae.
68. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
69. Brief for Appellant, p. 17.
70. Id. at 20.
71. Id. at 23.
72. Id. at 67.
73. Jurisdictional Statement for Appellants, p. 6.
74. Brief for Physicians as Amici Curiae.
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certed effort focused on a basic free speech-first amendment claim
went down the drain because, as the state had asserted, the "speech"
was too intermixed with a sequence of "action," consisting of physical
examinations, prescriptions, and in some cases the dispensing of birth
control devices, with a graduated scale of fees for those who could
pay.75 Regarding the merits of the free speech issue per se, one may
note that the "speech"-"action" dichotomy is easier to state than to
apply neatly and consistently, and may contrast Mr. Justice Black
in Griswold with Mr. Justice Black in Dennis v. United States. 70
Although Mr. Justice Black objected to the "planned course of conduct" in Griswold, it was just this concept that led the majority in
Dennis to affirm the convictions over Mr. Justice Black's dissent.
More relevant to the present discussion, however, is this question:
What would have been the effect of an attempted link-up between
a claim of marital privacy, defined· to include a need for information
of the birth control type, and a first amendment claim defined to
include a right against state denial of access to information which is
available and needed for intelligent decision? Such a combination
would not only have closed a logical gap in the case, but would also
have made it more difficult for Justices Black and Stewart to brush
aside the free-speech claim simply on the ground that "action" was
involved. With such a combination, the "action" at issue, which for
Justices Black and Stewart qualified out of existence the first amendment claim of the clinic staff, would appear in a new light as something supportive of the first amendment-information claim of those
who turned to the clinic for help. There would still be a planned
course of conduct, but it would be responsive to a first amendmentprivacy claim of married couples, and the fact the aid went beyond
advice to include the objects described in the advice would seem to
be incidental. When it is sometimes said that speech is an end in itself, what is really denoted is a feeling of the primacy of free speech
as a constitutional value, not that it is a passive entity in an actionless vacuum.
75. After noting that the clinic activity included supplying contraceptive devices,
Mr. Justice Black said: "Thus these defendants admittedly engaged with others in a
planned course of conduct to help people violate the Connecticut law. • , , What
would be the constitutional fate of the law if hereafter applied to punish nothing but
speech is, as I have said, quite another matter." 381 U.S. at 508 (dissenting opinion),
Similarly, Mr. Justice Stewart said: "If all the appellants had done was to advise peo•
pie that they thought the use of contraceptives was desirable, or even to counsel their
use, the appellants would, of course, have a substantial First Amendment claim. But
their activities went far beyond mere advocacy." Id. at 529 n.2 (dissenting opinion),
76. 341 U.S. ~94, 579 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
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In other words, is not the first amendment claim weak when
looked at only from the viewpoint of the dispensing of information,
because of the additional "action" factors on the part of the clinic,
and far stronger when looked at from the viewpoint of the recipient,
especially when it is intermixed with a "making privacy effective"
argument? Viewed thus, a finding of "action" should not end the
first amendment discussion, but should instead invite further inquiry as to purposes and effects.
IV. CONCLUSION
Elaboration of this suggested theory of an affirmative right of
access to birth control information must await further litigation.
It might be founded jointly on the first amendment and on the new
constitutionally recognized "penumbra!" right of marital privacy.
Additional support might be forthcoming from the once forgotten
but now remembered ninth amendment. If birth control information is available but for the intervening hand of the state, can that
hand perhaps be brushed aside by articulating a constitutionally
protected ninth amendment ·"other right" of private self-help and
self-control regarding an intimate sphere of private life? Could the
formula be generalized beyond birth control to other areas, or is
birth control sui generis?
Approached from a slightly different standpoint, is not the ninth
amendment concept of rights retained by the people well adapted
to support a constitutional policy of confining the privacy invasions
authorized by other constitutional processes to the bare minimum
necessary to accomplish valid social ends?77
Suffice it to say for the present that unless some kind of information-access theory is recognized as implicit in Griswold, then it stands
as a decision without a satisfying rationale. At least it will· stand
thus except for those who can JOin the Court in using the ploy of
77. There may be some unarticulated privacy aspects in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532 (1965), decided the same day as Griswold, in which a conviction was Teversed
because the trial had been televised. Except for a pa!:Sing mention in the Brief of the
Petitioner, pp. 16-18, and Mr. Justice Clark's statement in his opinion for the Court
that televised trial coverage "is a form of mental-if not physical-harassment" of the
defendant (381 U.S. at 549), the primary focus in the briefs and opinions was on denial of a fair trial because of the impact of television. See also Brief of American
Civil Liberties Union and the Texas Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae; Brief of the
American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae. And yet could it not be argued, consistently
with the result in Estes, that even though a trial is not a secret place, there is a
ninth amendment "other right" of a defendant not to have his public courtroom trial
transformed into a public television spectacle?
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"standing" to re-make the actual birth-control-clinic situation into
a marital-use-of-contraceptives situation. With the issue thus remade, we have a modern morality play, with much judicial fingershaking at fictional police invading a fictional bedchamber of a
fictional couple in search of evidence of the use of contraceptives.
The actual result of Griswold may be applauded, but to reach this
result was it necessary to play charades with the Constitution?

